We also construct confidence regions for partially identified voter characteristics in an augmented model with unobserved valence dimension, and identify the amount of voter heterogeneity necessary to reconcile the data with spatial preferences.
Introduction
The analysis of voting decisions is an integral part of the revealed preference theory of non-market interactions. A dominant framework in the analysis of voting data is the spatial theory of voting of (Hotelling 1929) and (Downs 1957) , which characterizes voters and candidates in an election by their positions in a common ideological space and postulates that voters choose candidates closest to them in that space (see (Hinich and Munger 1997) and (Poole 2005) for accounts of the theory).
Two fundamental questions arise regarding the empirical content of this theory.
(1) Are the distribution of voter ideological positions (hence voter preferences) identified on the basis of voting choices?
(2) Can the fundamental behavioral assumption of the spatial theory be rejected on the basis of voting data?
Following the work of (Heckman and Snyder 1997) and (Poole and Rosenthal 1997) , data on the position of candidates in a two-dimensional ideological space are now widely available (see also (Poole 2005) and references therein). Hence the first question can be reformulated in the following way: does the maintained assumption of spatial voting allow the identification of voter positions in the ideological space on the basis of the knowledge of candidate positions and aggregate voting outcomes? This question is answered affirmatively by (Merlo and de Paula 2009 ) who also provide a nonparametric estimation strategy with data on repeated elections. The second question is tackled in different guises by (Bogomolnaia and Laslier 2007) , (Degan and Merlo 2009 ) and (Kalandrakis 2010) . (Bogomolnaia and Laslier 2007) find the minimal dimension for the ideological space such that voter preference orderings over a finite number of candidates can be represented by spatial utility functions. Based on this result, we first provide an econometric methodology to formally test the hypothesis of spatial voting based on observed individual voting profiles from multiple elections, where the ideological position of candidates are known. The main difficulty in setting up a test of the spatial voting model is that the model does not pin down the data generating process for the voting profiles. This is in sharp contrast with the literature on compatibility of discrete choice probabilities and stochastic utility maximization. (Daly and Zachary 1979) and (McFadden 1979) give necessary and sufficient conditions for a discrete choice distribution to be compatible with the maximization of an additively separable random utility. See also (Borsch-Supan 1990) and (Koning and Ridder 2003) .
The compatibility conditions rely crucially on the coherency of the model, in the sense of (Heckman 1978) and (Gouriéroux, Laffont, and Monfort 1980) , and identifiability of its components.
We show that in the present context, despite lack of identification, the null hypothesis of compatibility between the voting data and the spatial model can still be formally tested with an appeal to partial identification techniques recently developed in (Galichon and Henry 2011) . This partial identification approach to revealed preference testing relates our work directly to (Blundell, Browning, and Crawford 2008) , (Hoderlein and Stoye 2009) and, even more closely (Kawai and Watanabe 2010) . The latter partially identify preference parameters in a voting model in which a fraction of voters incorporate strategic considerations in their voting decisions. A partially identified setting also arises in (Hoderlein and Stoye 2009 ) who provide a test of WARP based on consumption data from repeated cross sections of heterogeneous consumers. Finally, (Blundell, Browning, and Crawford 2008) also provide empirical implications of revealed preference axioms in the forms of bounds on demand responses.
We test spatial voting in US National elections for years 2000, 2004, and 2008 and the whole data combined. In all three elections, we reject the hypothesis that voters have elliptic preferences over candidates. That is to say, we reject the spatial voting model with heterogeneity of unknown form, both in voter bliss points and in the distances characterizing preferences. This brings new striking evidence to bear on the debate over the adequacy of the spatial voting model in explaining stylized facts on the positioning of political party platforms, and the convergence to the center implied by median voter results (see (Zakharov 2008) for an excellent account). Former empirical analysis and tests of the spatial voting model were conducted assuming knowledge of voter ideological positions (see (Alvarez and Nagler 1998) , (Jeong 2008) and references therein). The latter is a reasonable assumption, when analyzing roll call voting in the House and the Senate, but much less so, when analyzing voter behavior in general elections.
Another substantial distinction with roll call voting is the coexistence and competition of two voting logics in general elections, ideology versus performance. The spatial model describes voters' preferences over the candidate's program, whereas preferences over the candidate herself, involving charisma, experience and competence, are typically captured with an additive non spatial term in the utility, generally called valence. A fundamental difference between the valence dimensions and the dimensions of the ideological space is that preferences are satiated relative to the latter only.
The spatial model is augmented with a valence dimension in (Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000) and (Groseclose 2001) . (Azrieli 2009 ) axiomatizes the model and (Schofield 2007) shows that incorporating the valence dimension leads to equilibria, where party platforms do not all converge to the center of the electoral distribution.
As in the problem of testing the validity of the spatial model, the problem of estimating and testing valence specifications of the spatial model is complicated by the fact that voter's ideal points are unobserved and the model only partially identifies the distribution of voting profiles. We show how to construct confidence regions for the partial effect of distance to ideal point and of valence characteristics in the utility specification. Of particular empirical relevance are the spatial preference parameter configurations compatible with the smallest values of valence dispersion. These can be interpreted as estimates of the spatial preference parameters that best rationalize the data. A notable finding is that voter differ from candidates in their perception of the relevant ideological dimensions and that the liberal-conservative axis of the standard ideological space dominates the social issues axis in voter preferences. This opens the possibility for parties to gain vote shares by rebalancing political platforms.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the Section 1 we characterize the empirical content of the spatial model of voting. In Section 2, we introduce valence. The data is described in Section 3 and the empirical results in Section 4. The last section concludes. More generally, (Degan and Merlo 2009) Table 3 . In order to evaluate the statistical significance of these violations and examine alternative specifications, some form of voter heterogeneity needs to be introduced in the utility specification. Unobserved heterogeneity may be entertained within the spatial model in the form of voter specific distance d(., .; ω) as we describe in the next section. It may also take the form of a non spatial random utility term, when allowing for voters' response to non ideological characteristics of the candidate. We defer the discussion of the latter form of voter heterogeneity to Section 2 below. such that y j e minimizes d(y, y j e ; ω) among candidates j e ∈ {j e , l e } in each election e. For instance, in example 1, g(ω|X, y) = l 1 l 2 j 3 when y belongs to the central triangle. However, the position y of voters is unobservable, hence all that utility maximization predicts is that v lies within the set of compatible voting profiles, which depends on the positions of candidates X and the realization ω of preference heterogeneity. For instance, in example 1, the model only tells us that v lies in
We denote G(ω|X) this set of compatible voting profiles, i.e., G(ω|X) = y g(ω|X, y). The model predicts the following bound on the probability of voting profile being V = v:
since the only model prediction is g(ω|X, y) ∈ G(ω|X) for any y in the ideological space. Similarly, for any subset B of the set of all 2 m possible voting profiles, the model predicts the following bound on the probability of the voting profile V belonging to B.
The inequalities above specify a set of bounds on the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. As By theorem 1, Θ I is exactly the set of parameters θ such that the spatial voting model with heterogeneity is not rejected. Θ I is sometimes called sharp identified set to emphasize the fact that all values of θ in Θ I are observationally equivalent: no value in Θ I can be rejected on the basis of the information contained in the spatial model and the true distribution of voting profiles.
As a result, a test of the inequalities of Theorem 1 is a classical revealed preference test of the spatial voting model. The way we implement the test is to construct a confidence region for the identified set, using the methodology proposed in (Henry, Méango, and Queyranne 2010) and described in detail in Appendix A. In the data set described in Section 3, we find a 99% confidence region for the identified set Θ I to be empty, hence we reject the spatial voting model specification with distance heterogeneity at the 99% level of significance (see Section 4 for details). In other words, the data cannot be rationalized by a model with heterogenous elliptic preferences.
Introducing valence
The rejection of the spatial model leads to the consideration of a non spatial component in preferences. As mentioned in the introduction, there is a large literature in political science that attempts to reconcile voting models with observed (non converging) distributions of political party platforms by combining two logics of voting in voter preferences, the logic of ideology, in a spatial term, and the logic of performance, in a non spatial non satiated valence term. We now adopt this approach in our empirical investigation of the determinants of voting choices. The specification generally considered in the literature is the following: voter i maximizes utility
in each election over j ∈ J e candidates. The valence term E = (
. Let the distribution of the valence term be parameterized with parameter θ.
As in the case of heterogeneity in the distance characterizing preferences in Section 1, we denote by G( |X; ω) the set of compatible profiles for a given realization of unobserved valence heterogeneity.
The same reasoning applies to show that the inequalities
for each subset B of voting profiles, characterize the empirical content of the spatial model with valence heterogeneity (note that now is the random unobserved heterogeneity, whereas ω is treated In other words, for a given X characterizing the positions of all candidates, there is exactly one voting profile incompatible with Euclidean preferences and it belongs to a pair {v(X), v(X)}.
This pair is independent of , so that for different values of unobserved heterogeneity , the unique incompatible profile can only take value v(X) or v(X). In example 1 and figure 2, the two profiles that are potentially incompatible with spatial voting are profiles l 1 l 2 j 3 and j 1 j 2 l 3 . The formal proof is given in the appendix, but it is very easy to understand its heuristics in figure 2: j 1 j 2 l 3 is the only incompatible profile and l 1 l 2 j 3 is the only profile with compact support, which is compatible with spatial voting. The slopes of separating hyperplanes are independent of . Hence non compact profile supports cannot disappear, and the only profile that can disappear when shifts the location of the lines in the figure is l 1 l 2 j 3 . The latter disappears and is replaced by j 1 j 2 l 3 in any of the following three cases: H 1 moves sufficiently to the left, H 2 moves sufficiently to the right or H 3 moves sufficiently to the right. We are now in a position to show our simple characterization of the empirical content of the model.
Theorem 2 (Empirical content of model with valence). The empirical content of the spatial voting model is characterized by exactly 2 inequalities P(v(X)|X) ≤ P(v(X) ∈ G( |X; ω)|X; θ) and P(v(X)|X) ≤ P(v(X) ∈ G( |X; ω)|X; θ). (2.2)
In other words, if the two inequalities are satisfied, then all inequalities in [ECval] are satisfied and the spatial model with valence heterogeneity is compatible with the true voting profile distribution.
Conversely, if for some X, one of these two inequalities is violated, then the true voting distribution is incompatible with the spatial voting model with valence heterogeneity.
We are interested in the set Ξ I of parameter values ξ = (ω, θ) of the model (possibly empty) such that (2.2) holds. This set is the identified set in the model with valence heterogeneity. Our goal is to build a confidence region of asymptotic level cl for the identified set which is defined as a regionΞ satisfying P(Ξ I ⊆Ξ) cl asymptotically. The methodology derived from (Henry, Méango, and Queyranne 2010) is detailed in appendix A, where a step-by-step account of the procedure is given. The procedure involves few, relatively simple steps and is computationally efficient. Once the confidence regionΞ is obtained, we can directly test specifications of the spatial model at the same level of significance. Recall thatΞ is a set of values of the parameter vector ξ that are not rejected.
Suppose for illustration purposes, that is normal with mean zero and variance σ 2 . Suppose, moreover that the regionΞ does not contain any value of ξ with σ < 2, then σ 2 = 2 is a lower bound on the variance of unobserved valence necessary to rationalize the data with model (2.1).
Suppose further that the regionΞ does not contain any value of ξ with (ω 1 , ω 2 ) = (1, 0), then the spatial model with no distance distortion is rejected. If inΞ we always have ω 2 > 0 and ω 1 > 1, we can reject the hypothesis that the NOMINATE Common Space first coordinate (liberal-conservative axis) matters more to voters than the second coordinate (social issues).
The partial identification approach adopted here is particularly well suited to the revealed preference problem at hand. Indeed, we wish to test to what extent the spatial model rationalizes the data. We have no information about the position of voters in the ideological space, hence it is undesirable to predicate rejection of the spatial model on ad-hoc assumptions on the latter. This would be the case, if we parameterized the distribution of voter positions and valence heterogeneity, imposed additional restrictions for identification of this nonlinear model, estimated with maximum likelihood and tested for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity with a version of (Chesher 1984) . Table 2 . 2 ) is empty, so that the spatial voting model with distance heterogeneity is rejected at the 99% level of significance. We conclude that voters' choices cannot be rationalized by spatial voting, even if we let the shape of the indifference ellipses be voter specific.
4.2. Valence heterogeneity. We considered two parametric specification for the valence term in specification 2.1. We first modeled E = ( Table 2 . The minimum valence needed to rationalize the valence-augmented spatial model is of the order of the mean of squared distances between democratic candidates, half the mean of squared distances between all candidates and a quarter of the mean of squared distances between democratic and republican candidates. Moreover, for that minimal non spatial utility term, the model can only be rationalized for a specific distance distortion, namely ω = (ω 1 , ω 2 ) = (0.33, −0.11). This corresponds to a much greater emphasis on the liberal-conservative axis than on the social axis. This can be seen more clearly on figure 4(d) which shows the tilt of the major axis of the elliptic indifference curves of voters compatible with the minimum valence magnitude. The value is close to 100 degrees, which indicates a situation similar to the dotted vertical ellipse of figure 1. The NOMINATE Common Space is shared by voters, except that greater importance is given to changes on the liberal-conservative axis. We see on figure 4(d) that the tilt of the indifference ellipses remains between 45 and 135 degrees for any value of the non ideological disturbance η below 0.22. So the conclusion on the relative weights of each axis remains.
In case of normal specification of the valence term, the 95% confidence region for the set of parameters (ω, σ) for which the valence-augmented spatial model is rationalizable is similar to the previous case. The minimal standard deviation needed to rationalize the valence-augmented spatial model is 0.13. The corresponding indifference curves are ellipses with major axis titled at 100 degrees again, so that similar conclusions apply. The liberal-conservative axis remains dominant for all values of the valence standard deviation below 0.18. As seen on Table 4 choices with a single ideological dimension (liberal-conservative axis alone, namely ω 1 = ω 2 = 0) is 50% larger than the dispersion needed to rationalize voters' choices with two ideological dimensions (see Table 4 ).
Conclusion
We have considered the spatial model of voting and provided a methodology for conducting homophily, to complement work in (Christakis, Fowler, Imbens, and Kalyanaraman 2010) , (Galichon and Salanié 2010) and (Chiappori, Gandhi, Salanié, and Salanié 2009) .
Appendix A. Inference methodology
The methodology is detailed for inference on the identified set Ξ I in case of valence heterogeneity.
It also applies to inference on the identified set Θ I in case of distance heterogeneity with a trivial change of notation, Θ I for Ξ I and ω for , and replacing the two inequalities of Theorem 2 by the inequalities in [EC] .
We are interested in constructing a random regionΞ such that the true identified set Ξ I is contained inΞ with at least probability cl. Given the sample of observations ((
for a sample of n voters, we construct data dependent functions P (.|x) such that the following statement is true with probability tending to no less than cl: . . . , n,ṽ(X) ∈ {v(X) , v(X)}} satisfies the required conditions: indeed, if ξ ∈ Ξ I , ξ satisfies (2.2), so with probability no less than cl, it also satisfies P ( A.3. Construction of P (.|X): To construct P (.|X) we first compute a nonparametric estimator P (.|X) for P (.|X) (see (Li and Racine 2008) for the procedure and its properties). Heuristically, we want P ≤ P , i.e. P ≤P + (P −P ) with probability cl. The natural approach is to choose P equal to P plus the cl-quantile of the distribution of P −P . HoweverP − P is a random function, hence the quantile of its distribution is not defined. Instead, following (Henry, Méango, and Queyranne 
See (Henry, Méango, and Queyranne 2010) for discussion of the method and its properties. 
which is well defined since Λ is full rank. We transform also the (k + 1) th hyperplane. It is defined
where the function sign(x) is understood element by element when applied to a vector. We then have ∀x ∈ v + ,
which cannot be partitioned. But never both at the same time. Then, since the number of profiles which are not incompatible is ρ(k + 1, k) = 2 k+1 − 1, all the orthants except v + and v − are always partitioned, and this for all values of (µ 1 , ..., µ k+1 ).
The existence of an incompatible voting profile is due to the fact that one of two profiles {v, v} is not partitioned. Then, the incompatible profile is v if orthant v + is not partitioned, and v if orthant v − is not partitioned. This is complete our proof. 
Proof of Theorem

